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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge.*** 
 
This is an appeal by Stacy L. Deane from an order of the 
district court granting summary judgment to her former 
employer, Pocono Medical Center ("PMC"), on Deane's claim 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or the 
"Act"), 42 U.S.C. S 1201 et seq. In enacting the ADA, 
Congress intended that the scope of the Act would extend 
not only to those who are actually disabled, but also to 
individuals wrongly regarded by employers as being 
disabled. Deane, a registered nurse, sued PMC under the 
ADA as such a "regarded as" plaintiff to redress PMC's 
failure to accommodate her in a manner that would enable 
her to retain her position following a work-related injury 
that affected her ability to do heavy lifting.1 The case came 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
***Honorable Edward R. Becker, United States Circuit Judge for the 
Third Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on February 1, 1998. 
1. Deane also alleges that PMC improperly terminated her employment in 
violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. SS 701 et seq., and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
SS 951 et seq. Those claims are not before us. 
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before the en banc court to settle the question that divided 
the original panel -- whether "regarded as" plaintiffs, in 
order to be considered qualified under the ADA, must show 
that they are able to perform all of the functions of the 
relevant position or just the essential functions, with or 
without accommodation. The panel decided that they must 
be able to perform all of the functions. Before the en banc 
court, neither party supported that position, and we now 
reject it, concluding that the plain language of the ADA 
requires proof only of a plaintiff 's ability to perform a 
position's essential functions. 
 
This conclusion forces us to determine whether Deane 
has adduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to two elements of her prima facie 
case: (1) whether PMC misperceived Deane as being 
disabled; and (2) whether Deane is a "qualified individual", 
a decision that turns on whether lifting is an essential 
function of nursing at PMC. Because we conclude that 
Deane has adduced sufficient evidence regarding both of 
these matters, we hold that summary judgment was 
inappropriate. Accordingly, the judgment of the district 
court will be vacated and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
The panel addressed a second question of much greater 
difficulty -- whether "regarded as" plaintiffs must be 
accommodated by their employers within the meaning of 
the ADA. It may well be, as two members of the panel 
concluded, that after the employer is disabused of its 
improper perception of the individual's disability, there is 
no reason to afford the individual any special treatment, 
and hence the employee is not statutorily entitled to 
accommodation from the employer. However, as resolution 
of that issue is not necessary to final disposition of this 
appeal, we will not decide it. 
 
I. 
 
In April 1990, PMC hired Deane as a registered nurse to 
work primarily on the medical/surgical floor. On June 22, 
1991, while lifting a resistant patient, she sustained a 
cartilage tear in her right wrist causing her to miss 
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approximately one year of work. In June 1992, Deane and 
Barbara Manges, a nurse assigned to Deane's workers' 
compensation case, telephoned PMC and advised Charlene 
McCool, PMC's Benefits Coordinator, that Deane intended 
to return to work with certain restrictions. According to 
Deane, she informed McCool that she was unable to lift 
more than 15-20 pounds or perform repetitive manual 
tasks such as typing, but that her physician, Dr. Osterman, 
had released her to return to "light duty" work.2 Deane 
further explained to McCool that, if she could not be 
accommodated in a light duty position on the 
medical/surgical floor, she was willing to move to another 
area of the hospital, as long as she could remain in 
nursing. Unfortunately, this telephone call was PMC's only 
meaningful interaction with Deane during which it could 
have assessed the severity of or possible accommodation for 
her injuries. PMC never requested additional information 
from Deane or her physicians, and, according to Deane, 
when she subsequently attempted to contact PMC on 
several occasions, she was treated rudely by McCool and 
told not to call again. 
 
After speaking with Deane and Manges, McCool advised 
Barbara Hann, PMC's Vice President of Human Resources, 
of Deane's request to return to work, of her attendant work 
restrictions, and of her stated need for accommodation. 
Shortly after considering the information conveyed by 
McCool and after comparing it to the job description of a 
medical/surgical nurse at PMC, Hann determined that 
Deane was unable to return to her previous position. Hann 
then asked Carol Clarke, PMC's Vice President of Nursing, 
and Susan Stine, PMC's Director of Nursing Resources/ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In a letter dated June 8, 1992, the contents of which were 
communicated by Deane and Manges to McCool during their telephone 
conversation, Dr. Osterman opined as follows: 
 
       I do not think [Deane] can return to unrestricted nursing i.e. I 
would 
       place a lifting limit of 20 pounds and a limit on unrestricted 
       repetitive motion of her wrist. She does believe that she can 
return 
       to some nursing and I would agree with this. She has suggested 
       pediatric nursing, neonatal nursing and possibly even the cancer 
       unit at the hospital which apparently does not involve lifting the 
       patients. All would be acceptable. 
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Patient Care Services, to review Deane's request to return 
to PMC and to explore possible accommodations for her. 
Both Clarke and Stine concluded that Deane could not be 
accommodated in her previous job as a nurse on the 
medical/surgical floor or in any other available position at 
the hospital. Finally, Hann asked Marie Werkheiser, PMC's 
Nurse Recruiter, whether there were any current or 
prospective job openings for registered nurses at PMC. 
According to Werkheiser, there were no such openings at 
that time. 
 
As a result of the collective determination that Deane 
could not be accommodated in her previous job or in any 
other available position in the hospital, PMC sent Deane an 
"exit interview" form on August 7, 1992. On August 10, 
1992, Hann notified Deane by telephone that she could not 
return to work because of her "handicap", and this 
litigation ensued. In March 1993, Deane accepted a 
registered nurse position at a non-acute care facility, where 
she remained until May 1993. Deane has been employed by 
a different non-acute care facility since July 1993. Neither 
of these positions require heavy lifting, bathing patients, or 
the like. 
 
Deane argued to the district court that she was both 
actually disabled as a result of her injury and that she was 
perceived to be so by PMC. On summary judgment, the 
court rejected both theories and held that Deane was 
neither disabled nor regarded by her employer as being 
disabled and that, even if she were, she failed to meet the 
statutory definition of a qualified individual with a 
disability. Deane has not appealed the district court's 
determination that she was not actually disabled. Indeed, 
she now concedes that "[i]n light of the decisional trends in 
this Circuit and others," she is not now and never was 
disabled and, consequently, that, but for PMC's erroneous 
perception of her actual impairment, she would have no 
claim under the ADA. 
 
What is left, then, are Deane's contentions that she was 
disabled under the terms of the ADA by virtue of the fact 
that PMC regarded her limitations as being far worse than 
they actually were, that PMC failed to accommodate her 
lifting restriction, and that she was eventually terminated 
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on account of PMC's perception that she was disabled. In 
support of her perception claim, Deane relies on a"laundry 
list" of PMC's allegedly erroneous perceptions. According to 
Deane, PMC believed that she was unable to lift more than 
ten pounds, push or pull anything, assist patients in 
emergency situations, move or assist patients in the 
activities of daily living, perform any patient care job at 
PMC or any other hospital, perform CPR, use the rest of her 
body to assist patients, work with psychiatric patients, or 
use medical equipment. Deane refutes each of these 
perceptions -- or, in her view, misperceptions-- and 
contends that her injury was, in fact, relatively minor in 
nature. Deane further contends that PMC should be held 
responsible for these misperceptions because they were the 
result of PMC's "snap judgment" arrived at without making 
a good faith analysis, investigation, or assessment of the 
nature of her injury. 
 
Finally, Deane maintains that she requires and is entitled 
to accommodation for her lifting restriction. In this regard, 
Deane contends that she could be accommodated either in 
her previous position as a nurse on the medical/surgical 
floor or through reassignment to another position that 
would not require heavy lifting. As to the former, Deane has 
suggested the following accommodations: (1) use of an 
assistant to help her move or lift patients; (2) 
implementation of a functional nursing approach, in which 
nurses would perform only certain types of nursing tasks; 
and (3) use of a Hoyer lift to move patients. Deane also 
maintains that she could have been transferred to another 
unit within the medical center such as the pediatrics, 
oncology, or nursery units, which would not have required 
heavy lifting. In the alternative, Deane submits that she can 
perform the essential functions of her previous job in the 
medical/surgical floor without accommodation because 
lifting is not an essential function of nursing. We set forth 
our jurisdiction and standard of review in the margin.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's grant of 
summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Because our standard 
of review is plenary, see Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 104 (3d 
Cir. 1996), we apply the same test the district court should have applied 
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II. 
 
The core anti-discrimination section of the ADA provides 
that: 
 
       No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
       individual with a disability because of the disability of 
       such individual in regard to job application procedures, 
       the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
       employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
       conditions, and privileges of employment. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12112. In order to make out a prima facie case 
under the ADA, a plaintiff must be able to establish that he 
or she (1) has a "disability" (2) is a "qualified individual" 
and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because 
of that disability. See Gaul v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 
576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
A. 
 
Turning to the first prong of the prima facie  case, we 
must determine whether Deane is disabled under the terms 
of the Act. The ADA defines a "disability" as: 
 
       (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
       limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
       individual; 
 
       (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
 
       (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(g).4 Because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in the first instance. See Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 
947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 
1995). We must determine, therefore, whether the record, when viewed 
in the light most favorable to Deane, shows that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that PMC was entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322- 
23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); 
Olson, 101 F.3d at 951. 
 
4. Because the ADA does not define many of the pertinent terms, we are 
guided by the Regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
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Deane concedes that she is not actually disabled, but that 
she was only "regarded as" being disabled, we direct our 
focus to the third tier of the statutory definition. Read in 
conjunction with the first tier, which defines an actual 
disability, the third tier requires us to determine whether 
PMC regarded Deane as having an impairment and whether 
the impairment, as perceived by PMC, would have 
substantially limited one or more of Deane's major life 
activities.5 Deane's actual impairment, therefore, is of no 
consequence to our analysis. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Commission ("EEOC") to implement Title I of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12116 (requiring the EEOC to implement said Regulations); 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2. Regulations such as these are entitled to substantial deference. 
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982); Helen L. 
v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1995). 
5. With the "regarded as" prong, Congress chose to extend the 
protections of the ADA to individuals who have no actual disability. The 
primary motivation for the inclusion of misperceptions of disabilities in 
the statutory definition was that "society's accumulated myths and fears 
about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical 
limitations that flow from actual impairment." See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, 
app. S 1630.2(l) (EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance" to the ADA) (citing 
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)). 
 
The limited legislative history also confirms that Congress's primary 
concern in enacting the "regarded as" prong of the ADA was for 
individuals with no limitations but who, because of some non-limiting 
impairment, are prevented from obtaining employment as a result of 
societal prejudices. As the final House Report provides: 
 
        The rationale for this third test [the "regarded as" prong] as 
used 
       in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was articulated by the Supreme 
       Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline . The Court noted 
       that although an individual may have an impairment that does not 
       in fact substantially limit a major life activity, the reactions of 
others 
       may prove just as disabling. "Such an impairment might not 
       diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but could 
       nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a 
       result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment." 
 
        The Court concluded that, by including this test, "Congress 
       acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about 
       disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical 
       limitations that flow from actual impairment." 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III) (1990) at 30, reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
445, 453 ("House Judiciary Report") (footnotes omitted). 
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Turning to the EEOC Regulations, they provide that an 
individual is "regarded as" being disabled if he or she: 
 
       (1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that does 
       not substantially limit major life activities but is 
       treated by a covered entity as constituting such 
       limitation; 
 
       (2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that 
       substantially limits major life activities only as a result 
       of the attitude of others toward such impairment; or 
 
       (3) [h]as none of the impairments defined in 
       paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this section but is treated by 
       a covered entity as having a substantially limiting  
       impairment.6 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(l). See also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II), at 
53 (1990) ("House Labor Report"), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335; House Judiciary Report at 29, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 452. Common to each 
definition is the requirement that the individual not in fact 
have an impairment that, absent the misperceptions of 
others, would substantially limit a major life activity. 
 
Deane contends that she satisfies the first definition 
because PMC erroneously perceived that the nature and 
extent of her physical impairment "substantially limited" 
her ability to "work", which is included within the EEOC's 
definition of a "major life activity".7 See generally Olson, 101 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(h) defines "physical or mental impairment" as: 
 
       (1) [a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic 
       disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the 
       following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special 
sense 
       organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, 
       reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, 
       and endocrine; or 
 
       (2) [a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental 
       retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, 
       and specific learning disabilities. 
 
7. Major life activities include, but are not limited to, "functions such 
as 
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning, and working," see 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(i), as 
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F.3d at 953-55; MacDonald v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 94 F.3d 
1437, 1445 (10th Cir. 1996); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 94 
F.3d 329, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court rejected 
Deane's perceived disability claim on three grounds. First, 
the court found, as a matter of undisputed fact, that PMC 
regarded Deane's impairment as limiting only her ability to 
work as a nurse on the surgical/medical floor, not her 
ability to work as a nurse in general. Next, the court 
determined that Deane could not have been generally 
precluded from working in her field because, following her 
termination from PMC, she held two positions as a 
registered nurse. Finally, the court concluded, as a matter 
of law, that PMC's perception of Deane's impairment was 
not motivated by "myth, fear or stereotype" and, therefore, 
was not actionable under the ADA. We disagree with all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
well as "sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, 
app. S 1630.2(i); House Labor Report at 52, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334; House Judiciary Report at 28-29, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 451. 
 
Where, as here, the major life activity at issue is working, the term 
"substantially limited" is defined as "significantly restricted in the 
ability 
to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various 
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills and abilities." Olson, 101 F.3d at 952 (citing 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Thus, the mere "inability to perform a single, 
particular 
job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life 
activity 
of working." Id. In making these determinations, courts may consider: 
 
       (A) [t]he geographical area to which the individual has reasonable 
       access; 
 
       (B) [t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified 
       because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs 
       utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within 
that 
       geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified 
       because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or 
 
       (C) [t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified 
       because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs 
       not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, 
within 
       that geographical area, from which the individual is also 
disqualified 
       because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes). 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). 
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three of the court's rationales, discussing them in reverse 
order. 
 
Although the legislative history indicates that Congress 
was concerned about eliminating society's myths, fears, 
stereotypes, and prejudices with respect to the disabled, the 
EEOC's Regulations and Interpretive Guidance make clear 
that even an innocent misperception based on nothing 
more than a simple mistake of fact as to the severity, or 
even the very existence, of an individual's impairment can 
be sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of a perceived 
disability. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.S 1630.2(l) 
(describing, as one example of a "regarded as" disabled 
employee, an individual with controlled high blood pressure 
that is not substantially limiting, who nonetheless is 
reassigned to less strenuous work because of the 
employer's unsubstantiated fear that the employee will 
suffer a heart attack). Thus, whether or not PMC was 
motivated by myth, fear or prejudice is not determinative of 
Deane's "regarded as" claim. 
 
The second ground -- that Deane's subsequent 
employment in the field of nursing demonstrated that she 
was not substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working -- confuses her actual impairment with PMC's 
misperception thereof. Deane's subsequent work history 
could, at most, reflect her lack of an actual disability, and 
it therefore sheds no light whatever on whether, at the time 
of her termination, PMC regarded her impairment as 
substantially limiting her ability to work. 
 
Finally, contrary to the district court's conclusion, Deane 
has adduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether PMC regarded her as 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. 
First, there is deposition testimony from PMC officials 
documenting confusion as to the extent of Deane's physical 
capacity, with regard to pushing, pulling, and lifting. There 
is also evidence that PMC fundamentally misunderstood 
and exaggerated the limitations that the wrist injury 
imposed on Deane. Moreover, PMC's apparent 
misunderstanding is in line with other testimony that PMC 
did not evaluate Deane, contact her physicians, or 
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independently review her medical records, but rather relied 
solely on one telephone conversation it had with Deane. 
 
Deane also produced the affidavit and report of Daniel 
Rappucci, her vocational expert, who explained the import 
of PMC's perception of Deane's injury. Rappucci concluded 
that, had Deane been impaired to the extent allegedly 
perceived by PMC, she would have been precluded from 
consideration for employment, both within her chosen 
profession and within a wide range of jobs within her 
geographic region. Rappucci further opined that Deane 
would have been precluded from performing not only many 
of the available jobs in service-producing industries, 
(including transportation, wholesale/retail, finance, real 
estate, hospitality industries, medical services, and 
professional services), which made up 83% of the 41,000 
non-agricultural jobs in Deane's county of residence, but 
also most of the jobs in the goods-producing industries 
(contract construction, mining, and manufacturing), which 
comprised the remaining 17% of available positions. PMC 
counters with the argument that it attempted to 
accommodate Deane by placing her in other light-duty 
positions when and if they became available, and that this 
suggests that PMC did not believe Deane to be disabled. 
PMC submits that its actions indicate only that PMC 
considered Deane to be incapable of performing certain 
functions that precluded her from returning to nursing. 
 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, however, there 
are factual disputes over how impaired PMC regarded 
Deane as being compared with her actual level of 
impairment, and whether PMC's perception of Deane 
constituted a "significant[ ] restrict[ion] in [Deane's] ability 
to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average person having 
comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Deane has thus adduced sufficient evidence 
that PMC regarded her as substantially more physically 
impaired than she actually was, and that PMC's 
misperception, if correct, would satisfy the S 1630.2(j)(3)(i) 
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threshold. Therefore, summary judgment on this issue was 
inappropriate.8 
 
B. 
 
The second element of Deane's prima facie case under the 
ADA requires her to demonstrate that she is a "qualified 
individual". The ADA defines this term as an individual 
"who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the employment position 
that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12111(8). The Interpretive Guidance to the EEOC 
Regulations divides this inquiry into two prongs. First, a 
court must determine whether the individual satisfies the 
requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related 
requirements of the employment position that such 
individual holds or desires. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. 
S 1630.2(m). Second, it must determine whether the 
individual, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the position held or 
sought. See id.; see also Bombard v. Fort Wayne 
Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson 
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 
1995). Because PMC does not dispute Deane's general 
qualifications as a registered nurse, we need not dwell on 
the first step of the "qualified individual" analysis. 
 
Determining whether an individual can, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions 
of the position held or sought, also a two step process, is 
relatively straightforward. First, a court must consider 
whether the individual can perform the essential functions 
of the job without accommodation. If so, the individual is 
qualified (and, a fortiori, is not entitled to accommodation). 
If not, then a court must look to whether the individual can 
perform the essential functions of the job with a reasonable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In a related vein, PMC seems to suggest that there is no causal 
relationship between the alleged misperception and Deane's discharge in 
that PMC took Deane's original statement that she could do no lifting 
and needed major accommodation at face value. Thus, according to 
PMC, Deane was not discharged because of its misperception. But there 
is also a genuine issue of fact here as well, see infra Parts II.B.2 and 
III. 
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accommodation.9 If so, the individual is qualified. If not, the 
individual has failed to set out a necessary element of the 
prima facie case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. "In general, an accommodation is any change in the work environment 
or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual 
with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities." 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630, app. S 1630.2(o). The text of the ADA provides that "reasonable 
accommodation" may include-- 
 
       (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible 
       to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
 
       (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
       reassignment to vacant position, acquisition or modifications of 
       equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
       examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
       qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations 
       for individuals with disabilities. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12111(9) (emphasis added). 
 
The EEOC Regulations further define "reasonable accommodation" to 
include 
 
       (i) [m]odifications or adjustments to a job application process 
that 
       enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for 
the 
       position such applicant desires; or 
 
       (ii) [m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to 
       the manner or circumstances under which the position held or 
       desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified 
individual 
       with a disability to perform the essential functions of that 
position; 
       or 
 
       (iii) [m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's 
       employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges 
of 
       employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees 
       without disabilities. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(o)(1). 
 
An individual's right to reasonable accommodation may be subject, 
however, to certain limitations. For example, an employer is not required 
to provide accommodation if it would impose an "undue hardship" on the 
employer as defined in 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(p). An employer also is not 
required to provide accommodation if the individual poses a "direct 
threat" to the health or safety of himself/herself or others unless such 
accommodation would either eliminate such risk or reduce it to an 
acceptable level. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(r). 
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The majority panel opinion, in deciding for PMC, 
reasoned that to satisfy the first step, a "regarded as" 
plaintiff must make a showing that he or she could perform 
all the functions of the job (with or without 
accommodation), not just its essential functions. PMC 
disassociated itself from the panel's position before the en 
banc court. As this issue is one of statutory construction, 
the "first step in interpreting a statute is to determine 
whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute 
in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. 
Ct. 843, 846 (1997). 
 
1. 
 
The ADA prohibits a "covered entity" from discriminating 
against a "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(a). Section 12111(8), which defines the latter term, 
reads: 
 
       The term "qualified individual with a disability" means 
       an individual with a disability who, with or without 
       reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
       functions of the employment position that such 
       individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this 
       subchapter, consideration shall be given to the 
       employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are 
       essential, and if an employer has prepared a written 
       description before advertising or interviewing 
       applicants for the job, this description shall be 
       considered evidence of the essential functions of the 
       job. 
 
Section 12111(8) is plain and unambiguous. The first 
sentence of that section, makes it clear that the phrase 
"with or without reasonable accommodation" refers directly 
to "essential functions". Indeed, there is nothing in the 
sentence, other than "essential functions", to which "with 
or without reasonable accommodation" could refer. 
Moreover, nowhere else in the Act does it state that, to be 
a "qualified individual", an individual must prove his or her 
ability to perform all of the functions of the job, and 
nowhere in the Act does it distinguish between actual or 
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perceived disabilities in terms of the threshold showing of 
qualifications. Therefore, if an individual can perform the 
essential functions of the job without accommodation as to 
those functions, regardless of whether the individual can 
perform the other functions of the job (with or without 
accommodation), that individual is qualified under the ADA. 
 
The history of the ADA confirms this view. In the 
committee reports that accompanied the ADA, Congress 
spoke directly to the qualifications standard adopted in the 
statute. Repeatedly, Congress stated that the qualifications 
standard turned on the individual's ability to perform the 
"essential functions" of the job. See e.g. , House Labor 
Report at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337; House 
Judiciary Report at 32-33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 455. Congress explained that the Act focused on an 
individual's ability to perform "essential functions" to 
ensure that persons with disabilities "not be disqualified 
because of the inability to perform non-essential or 
marginal functions of the job." House Judiciary Report at 
31-32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 454. As stated in 
one committee report, the purpose of the ADA's 
qualifications standard is to "ensure that employers can 
continue to require that all applicants and employees, 
including those with disabilities, are able to perform the 
essential functions, i.e., the non-marginal functions of the 
job in question." House Labor Report at 55, reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337 (emphasis added). 
 
2. 
 
Having rejected the panel's position that Deane needed to 
make a showing that she can perform all of the functions 
of her former job, we must now determine whether Deane 
has, in fact, adduced sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment on the question whether she can 
perform the essential functions of the job without 
accommodation as to those functions. Deane claims that 
the heavy lifting she is restricted from doing is not an 
essential job function of a nurse. Deane describes nursing 
as a profession that focusses primarily on skill, intellect, 
and knowledge. While conceding that lifting constitutes part 
of a nurse's duties, she submits that it is only a small part. 
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In support of her contentions, Deane again offers 
Rappucci's affidavit and report. Rappucci opines that 
patient care, not heavy lifting of patients, is the essential 
function of registered nursing. As evidence, he references 
the Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
Job Descriptions ("DOL Dictionary"), which details four 
critical tasks of a general duty nurse, none of which 
involves heavy lifting: (1) administering medications and 
treatments, (2) preparing equipment and aiding physicians 
during the treatment of patients, (3) observing patients and 
recording significant conditions and reactions to drugs, 
treatments, and significant incidents, and (4) taking 
temperature, pulse, blood pressure, and other vital signs to 
detect deviations from normal and assess the condition of 
the patient. Rappucci also notes that nursing is a 
professional occupation, and he compares it with orderly 
work to exemplify the differences between the two positions. 
For example, whereas nursing is classified by the 
Department of Labor as skilled, medium duty labor, orderly 
work is classified as semi-skilled, heavy-duty labor. Also, 
whereas none of a general nurse's critical tasks under the 
DOL Dictionary description include lifting, the description 
of orderly work enumerates "lift[ing] patients onto and from 
bed" as critical task number five. This is because, according 
to Deane, the orderly position exists to assist the nurse 
professional in the performance of his or her job duties. 
Finally, Deane points out that, recognizing the difficulty of 
unassisted heavy lifting, PMC uses a team approach to the 
lifting of patients, both in routine matters and in 
responding to emergency situations.10 
 
PMC responds that lifting is an essential function of a 
nurse. In support, PMC cites its job description, which 
details under the heading "MAJOR TASKS, DUTIES 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES" that one of the "WORKING 
CONDITIONS" for a staff registered nurse is the"[f]requent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Rappucci also contends that PMC misdefines the essential functions 
of the nurse position (e.g., by including lifting of laundry bags as a 
"major task duty and responsibility"). Rappucci argues that this confuses 
method with function in that lifting is a method of accomplishing a task, 
rather than a specific job function in relation to nursing. 
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lifting of patients."11 PMC also notes that Deane conceded 
that the PMC job description was "an accurate reflection of 
the tasks, duties and responsibilities as well as the 
qualifications, physical requirements and working 
conditions of a registered nurse at [PMC]," and that among 
her "critical job demands" at PMC were: (1) the placement 
of patients in water closets, tub chairs or gurneys, (2) the 
changing of position of patients, and (3) the lifting of 
laundry bags. These pieces of evidence, contends PMC, 
constitute multiple admissions by Deane that lifting is an 
essential function of a staff registered nurse at PMC. 
Finally, PMC asserts that the consequences of a nurse's 
inability to lift patients could create a dangerous situation 
in the hospital for Deane and her patients. 
 
We decline to apply conclusive effect to either the job 
description or PMC's judgment as to whether heavy lifting 
is essential to Deane's job. The EEOC's Interpretive 
Guidance indicates that "the employer's judgment as to 
which functions are essential" and "written job descriptions 
prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants" are 
two possible types of evidence for determining the essential 
functions of a position, but that such evidence is not to be 
given greater weight simply because it is included in the 
non-exclusive list set out in 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(n)(3). See 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. S 1630.2(n). Thus, the job description 
is not, as PMC contends, incontestable evidence that 
unassisted patient lifting is an essential function of Deane's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Rappucci criticizes the job description for utilizing incorrect 
language 
to describe the lifting requirements. For example, according to the 
Department of Labor, "frequent lifting of patients" means that the task 
is performed 33% to 66% of the day, or approximately 3-5 hours over an 
eight hour work shift. Deane contends that this description is 
implausible (and inaccurate) and conflicts with other testimony. For 
example, Joan Campagna, a registered staff nurse at PMC since 1987, 
swore in her affidavit that a PMC nurse typically spends only minutes 
per day repositioning patients in their beds, transferring patients from 
bed to gurney or vice versa, and moving patients into and out of 
wheelchairs. Moreover, Campagna notes that these tasks are nearly 
always accomplished by two people and that PMC employs orderlies, 
licensed practical nurses, and nurses aides whose duties are to assist 
registered nurses in all patient care activities, including the lifting 
and 
transferring of patients. 
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job. Moreover, the EEOC Regulations also provide that 
while "inquiry into the essential functions is not intended to 
second guess an employer's business judgment with regard 
to production standards," whether a particular function is 
essential "is a factual determination that must be made on 
a case by case basis [based upon] all relevant evidence." Id. 
(emphasis added). Finally, the import of the rest of PMC's 
evidence (e.g., her alleged admissions, etc.) is disputed by 
Deane. For all these reasons, we find that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether 
Deane was a qualified individual under the ADA. 12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In view of this conclusion, we need not reach the more difficult 
question addressed by the panel whether "regarded as" disabled 
plaintiffs must be accommodated by their employers if they cannot 
perform the essential functions of their jobs. Deane contends that, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, "regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled 
to 
the same reasonable accommodations from their employers as are 
actually disabled plaintiffs. She reasons that, just as we found that a 
plain reading of the ADA only requires plaintiffs to show that they can 
perform the essential functions of the job, a plain reading of the 
definition of "qualified individual" demonstrates that a "regarded as" 
plaintiff is qualified so long as she can perform the essential functions 
with reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C.S 12111(8) (defining a 
"qualified individual" as one "who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires"); see also 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(m). Moreover, Deane submits that this plain reading of the 
statute is buttressed by the Supreme Court's decision in Arline, 480 U.S. 
at 288-89 (holding that, under the Rehabilitation Act, employers have an 
affirmative obligation to make reasonable accommodations for employees 
who are perceived to be handicapped). More importantly, according to 
Deane, failure to mandate reasonable accommodations for "regarded as" 
plaintiffs would undermine the role the ADA plays in ferreting out 
disability discrimination in employment. This is because, following 
Deane's logic, the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition is 
premised upon the reality that the perception of disability, socially 
constructed and reinforced, is difficult to destroy, and in most cases, 
merely informing the employer of its misperception will not be enough. 
 
In countering Deane's position, PMC notes preliminarily that a 
"regarded as" plaintiff 's only disability is the employer's irrational 
response to her illusory condition. Under these circumstances, reasons 
PMC, it simply makes no sense to talk of accommodations for any 
physical impairments because, by definition, the impairments are not 
the statutory cause of the plaintiff 's disability. Adopting Deane's 
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C. 
 
Finally, we find that Deane can easily establish the third 
prong of her prima facie case. The August 10, 1992, call 
from Hann terminating Deane because of her "handicap" is 
uncontroverted direct evidence that Deane suffered an 
adverse employment action because of her employer's 
perception of her disability. See Martinson v. Kinney Shoe 
Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686 (4th Cir. 1997) ("When an 
employer concededly discharges an employee because of a 
disability, the employee need prove nothing more to meet 
the third prong of the prima facie test."). 
interpretation of the ADA would, in PMC's view: (1) permit healthy 
employees to, through litigation (or the threat of litigation) demand 
changes in their work environments under the guise of "reasonable 
accommodations" for disabilities based upon misperceptions; and (2) 
create a windfall for legitimate "regarded as" disabled employees who, 
after disabusing their employers of their misperceptions, would 
nonetheless be entitled to accommodations that their similarly situated 
co-workers are not, for admittedly non-disabling conditions. 
 
While we acknowledge the considerable force of PMC's argument, 
especially the latter point, we express no position on the accommodation 
issue, and note that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
has not taken an official position yet either. See Brief for the Equal 
Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 6. We note, however, that 
if it turns out that a "regarded as" plaintiff who cannot perform the 
essential functions of her job is not entitled to accommodation (and 
therefore does not have to be reinstated), he or she need not necessarily 
be without remedy. The plaintiff still might be entitled to injunctive 
relief 
against future discrimination, see EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace, 813 
F.2d 1539, 1544 (9th Cir. 1987) (listing benefits of injunctive relief, 
including: (1) instructing employers to comply with federal law, (2) 
subjecting employers to the contempt power of the federal courts for 
future violations, and (3) reducing the chilling effect of employers' 
alleged 
discrimination); King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259 
(8th Cir. 1984), to compensatory or punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1981a, see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 
459-60 (1975) (punitive damages); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (compensatory damages), and/or to counsel fees under 42 
U.S.C. S 1988(b). 
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III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be reversed and the case remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Although not a ground of our decision, we take this 
opportunity to observe that this protracted (and very much 
ongoing) litigation would likely have been unnecessary had 
the parties taken seriously the precepts announced in our 
opinion in Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 1997). 
In that decision, we highlighted the importance of 
communication and cooperation between employers and 
employees in seeking reasonable accommodations. See id. 
at 416. Specifically, we noted that, in the context of the 
Rehabilitation Act, "both parties have a duty to assist in the 
search for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to 
act in good faith."13 Id . at 420. In this case, the single 
telephone interaction between Deane and McCool at PMC 
hardly satisfies our standard that the employer make 
"reasonable efforts to assist [the employee], to communicate 
with him in good faith, and to not impede his investigation 
[for employment]." Id. (citations omitted). While it may turn 
out that reasonable accommodation for Deane is impossible 
(or is not required because she is a "regarded as" plaintiff), 
nevertheless, an employer who fails to engage in the 
interactive process runs a serious risk that it will 
erroneously overlook an opportunity to accommodate a 
statutorily disabled employee, and thereby violate the ADA. 
Id. at 420-21. 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
13. As we noted in Mengine, interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act's 
"reasonable accommodation" provisions are relevant to our analysis of 
the ADA and vice versa because in 1992, Congress amended the section 
of the Rehabilitation Act defining "reasonable accommodation" to 
incorporate the standards of the ADA. See 114 F.3d at 420 & n.4 (citing 
29 U.S.C. S 794(d)). 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent. I recognize, of course, that a 
"qualified individual with a disability" need not actually 
have an impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
her major life activities as it is sufficient if the employer 
regards her as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. 
S 12102(2)(C). Thus, if a covered employer discriminated 
against such an individual in a manner barred by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, it would violate the Act. 42 
U.S.C. S 12112(a). 
 
But, as I see this case, the issue here is different. As the 
majority has pointed out, the district court found that 
Deane was not actually disabled and she has not appealed 
that determination. The issue then is whether a person who 
is not actually disabled can demand a reasonable 
accommodation from an employer. After all it was Deane 
who claimed to need the lifting restriction and who claimed 
that she had to avoid repetitive manual tasks. To me the 
answer has to be no. I cannot understand how an employee 
who is not actually disabled can indicate that she must 
have an accommodation for her work, and then, when the 
employer takes her at her word but declines to grant the 
accommodation, assert a valid cause of action against 
the employer under the ADA. Congress did not pass the 
ADA to permit persons without a disability to demand 
accommodations. 
 
It is helpful to consider the following hypothetical. Let us 
assume that employees in the heavy construction industry 
in the ordinary course of their employment regularly lift 
very heavy loads. An applicant for employment who is not 
actually disabled indicates to the employer that she cannot 
lift heavy loads but requests an accommodation to avoid 
the lifting. The prospective employer refuses to make the 
accommodation. In my view, the employer does not violate 
the ADA, and when Deane's case is analyzed it is not 
different. She, too, was not disabled but asked for an 
accommodation. 
 
The majority believes that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to "whether PMC misperceived Deane as 
being disabled." Maj. Op. at 3. But that dispute does not 
 
                                22 
  
matter, for the critical issue is not how PMC viewed Deane 
because there is simply no escape from the fact that an 
essential element of Deane's case is that "PMC failed to 
accommodate her lifting restriction." Maj. Op. at 5. After all, 
as the majority explains, "Deane maintains that she 
requires and is entitled to accommodation for her lifting 
restriction." Maj. Op. at 6. But no matter what 
misconceptions PMC may have had about Deane, it was 
Deane who requested the accommodation. Thus, even if 
PMC regarded her as more substantially impaired than she 
actually was, this misperception does not matter for she 
was not entitled to any accommodation. It is critical to 
remember that this is not a case in which the employer 
perceived the employee to be disabled and then refused to 
make the accommodation which it believed she needed. 
 
The majority indicates that there is a genuine dispute of 
material fact regarding whether heavy lifting is an essential 
function of her former job. I agree that there is a genuine 
dispute of fact as to whether heavy lifting is an essential 
function of the job. But, just as the dispute of fact 
regarding PMC's perception of Deane does not matter, 
neither does the heavy lifting dispute because it is not 
material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 
248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). Inasmuch as Deane 
is not actually disabled, she has no right to an 
accommodation whether or not the accommodation would 
impact on her ability to perform the essential functions of 
the job. Furthermore, an employer can determine what it 
believes are the essential elements for a particular job 
without concern that its determination might be challenged 
under the ADA by a person who is not actually disabled. 
 
In my view, this case is quite straightforward but 
somehow has become complicated. I respectfully dissent as 
I would affirm the summary judgment. 
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